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해외주문 · POD

Philosophical Grammar

University of California Press · 2005년 06월 01일
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"There is much in this book that is both important and more clearly stated than elsewhere in his 'later philosophy.'"--"Georgia Review

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  • Part I The Proposition and its Sense
    I
    How can one talk about ``understanding'' and ``not understanding'' a proposition?
    Surely it's not a proposition until it's understood? 39(1)
    Understanding and signs. Frege against the formalists. Understanding like seeing a picture that makes all the rules clear; in that case the picture is itself a sign, a calculus.
    ``To understand a language'' -- to take in a symbolism as a whole.
    Language must speak for itself. 39(2)
    One can say that meaning drops out of language.
    In contrast: ``Did you mean that seriously or as a joke?'' When we mean (and don't just say) words it seems to us as if there were something coupled to the words. 41(1)
    Comparison with understanding a piece of music: for explanation I can only translate the musical picture into a picture in another medium -- and why just that picture? Comparison with understanding a picture. Perhaps we see only patches and lines -- ``we do not understand the picture''. Seeing a genre-picture in different ways. 41(1)
    ``I understand that gesture'' -- it says something.
    In a sentence a word can be felt as belonging first with one word and then with another.
    A `proposition' may be what is conceived in different ways or the way of conceiving itself.
    A sentence from the middle of a story I have not read.
    The concept of understanding is a fluid one. 42(1)
    A sentence in a code: at what moment of translating does understanding begin?
    The words of a sentence are arbitrary; so I replace them with letters. But now I cannot immediately think the sense of the sentence in the new expression.
    The notion that we can only imperfectly exhibit our understanding: the expression of understanding has something missing that is essentially inexpressible. But in that case it makes no sense to speak of a more complete expression. 43(2)
    What is the criterion for an expression's being meant thus? A question about the relationship between two linguistic expressions. Sometimes a translation into another mode of representation. 45(1)
    Must I understand a sentence to be able to act on it? If ``to understand a sentence'' means somehow or other to act on it, then understanding cannot be a precondition for our acting on it. -- What goes on when I suddenly understand someone else? There are many possibilities here. 45(1)
    Isn't there a gap between an order and its execution? ``I understand it, but only because I add something to it, namely the interpretation.'' -- But if one were to say ``any sentence still stands in need of an interpretation'', that would mean: no sentence can be understood without a rider. 46(1)
    ``Understanding a word'' -- being able to apply it. -- ``When I said `I can play chess' I really could.'' How did I know that I could? My answer will show in what way I use the word ``can''.
    Being able is called a state. ``To describe a state'' can mean various things. ``After all I can't have the whole mode of application of a word in my head all at once.'' 47(3)
    It is not a question of an instantaneous grasping. --
    When a man who knows the game watches a game of chess, the experience he has when a move is made usually differs from that of someone else watching without understanding the game. But this experience is not the knowledge of the rules. -- The understanding of language seems like a background; like the ability to multiply.
    When do we understand a sentence? -- When we've uttered the whole of it? Or while uttering it? 50(1)
    When someone interprets, or understands, a sign in one sense or another, what he is doing is taking a step in a calculus. -- ``Thought'' sometimes means a process which may accompany the utterance of a sentence and sometimes the sentence itself in the system of language. 50(2)
    II
    Grammar as (e.g.) the geometry of negation. We would like to say: ``Negation has the property that when it is doubled it yields an affirmation''. But the rule doesn't give a further description of negation, it constitutes negation. 52(1)
    Geometry no more speaks about cubes than logic does about negation.
    It looks as if one could infer from the meaning of negation that ``~ ~ p'' means p. 52(1)
    What does it mean to say that the ``is'' in ``The rose is red'' has a different meaning from the ``is'' in ``twice two is four''? Here we have one word but as it were different meaning-bodies with a single end surface: different possibilities of constructing sentences. The comparison of the glass cubes. The rule for the arrangement of the red sides contains the possibilities, i.e. the geometry of the cube. The cube can also serve as a notation for the rule if it belongs to a system of propositions. 53(2)
    ``The grammatical possibilities of the negation-sign''. The T-F notation can illustrate the meaning of ``not''. The written symbol becomes a sign for negation only by the way it works -- the way it is used in the game. 55(1)
    If we derive geometrical propositions from a drawing or a model, then the model has the role of a sign in a game. We use the drawing of a cube again and again in different contexts. It is this sign that we take to be the cube in which the geometrical laws are already laid up. 55(1)
    My earlier concept of meaning originates in a primitive philosophy of language. -- Augustine on the learning of language. He describes a calculus of our language, only not everything that we call language is this calculus. 56(1)
    As if words didn't also have functions quite different from the naming of tables, chairs, etc. -- Here is the origin of the bad expression: a fact is a complex of objects. 57(1)
    In a familiar language we experience different parts of speech as different. It is only in a foreign language that we see clearly the uniformity of words. 58(1)
    If I decide to use a new word instead of ``red'', how would it come out that it took the place of the word ``red''? 59(1)
    The meaning of a word: what the explanation of its meaning explains. (If, on the other hand by ``meaning'' we mean a characteristic sensation, then the explanation of meaning would be a cause.) 59(1)
    Explanation can clear up misunderstandings. In that case understanding is a correlate of explanation. -- Definitions.
    It seems as if the other grammatical rules for a word had to follow from its ostensive definition. But is this definition really unambiguous? One must understand a great deal of a language in order to understand the definition. 60(1)
    The words ``shape'', ``colour'' in the definitions determine the kind of use of the word. The ostensive definition has a different role in the grammar of each part of speech. 61(1)
    So how does it come about that on the strength of this definition we understand the word?
    What's the sign of someone's understanding a game? Can't he learn a game simply by watching it being played? Learning and speaking without explicit rules. We are always comparing language with a game according to rules. 61(2)
    The names I give to bodies, shapes, colours, lengths have different grammars in each case. The meaning of a name is not the thing we point to when we give an ostensive definition of the name. 63(1)
    What constitutes the meaning of a word like ``perhaps''?
    I know how it is used. The case is similar when someone is explaining to me a calculation ``that I don't quite understand''. ``Now I know how to go on.'' How do I know that I know how to go on? 64(1)
    Is the meaning really only the use of the word? Isn't it the way this use meshes with our life? 65(1)
    The words ``fine'', ``oh'', ``perhaps'' . . . can each be the expression of a feeling. But I don't call that feeling the meaning of the word.
    I can replace the sensations by intonation and gestures.
    I could also treat the word (e.g. ``oh'') itself as a gesture. 66(1)
    A language spoken in a uniform metre.
    Relationships between tools in a toolbox.
    ``The meaning of a word: its role in the calculus of language.'' Imagine how we calculate with ``red''. And then: the word ``oh'' -- what corresponds now to the calculus? 67(1)
    Describing ball-games. Perhaps one will be unwilling to call some of them ball-games; but it is clear where the boundary is to be drawn here?
    We consider language from one point of view only.
    The explanation of the purpose or the effect of a word is not what we call the explanation of its meaning. It may be that if it is to achieve its effect a particular word cannot be replaced by any other, just as it may be that a gesture cannot be replaced by any other. -- We only bother about what's called the explanation of meaning and not about meaning in any other sense. 68(1)
    Aren't our sentences parts of a mechanism? As in a pianola? But suppose it is in bad condition? So it is not the effect but the purpose that is the sense of the signs (the holes in the pianola roll). Their purpose within the mechanism.
    We need an explanation that is part of the calculus.
    ``A symbol is something that produces this effect.'' -- How do I know that it is the one I meant?''
    We could use a colour-chart: and then our calculus would have to get along with the visible colour-sample. 69(2)
    ``We could understand a penholder too, if we had given it a meaning.'' Does the understanding contain the whole system of its application?
    When I read a sentence with understanding something happens: perhaps a picture comes into my mind. But before we call ``understanding'' is related to countless things that happen before and after the reading of this sentence.
    When I don't understand a sentence -- that can be different things in different cases.
    ``Understanding a word'' -- that is infinitely various. 71(3)
    ``Understanding'' is not the name of a single process but of more or less interrelated processes against a background of the actual use of a learnt language. -- We think that if I use the word ``understanding'' in all these cases there must be some one thing that happens in all of them. Well, the concept-word certainly does show a kinship but this need not be the sharing of a common property or constituent. -- The concept-word ``game''. ``By `knowledge' we mean these processes, and these, and similar ones.'' 74(3)
    III
    If for our purposes we wish to regulate the use of a word by definite rules, then alongside its fluctuating use we set a different use. But this isn't like the way physics gives a simplified description of a natural phenomenon. It is not as if we were saying something that would hold only of an ideal language. 77(1)
    We understand a genre-picture if we recognize what the people in it are doing. If this recognition does not come easily, there is a period of doubt followed by a familiar process of recognition. If on the other hand we take it in at first glance it is difficult to say what the understanding -- the recognition say -- consists of. There is no one thing that happens that could be called recognition.
    If I want to say ``I understand it like that'' then the ``like that'' stands for a translation into a different expression. Or is it a sort of intransitive understanding? 77(2)
    Forgetting the meaning of a word. Different cases. The man feels, as he looks at blue objects, that the connection between the word ``blue'' and the colour has been broken off. We might restore the connection in various ways. The connection is not made by a single phenomenon, but can manifest itself in very various processes. Do I mean then that there is no such thing as understanding but only manifestations of understanding? -- a senseless question. 79(1)
    How does an ostensive definition work? Is it put to work again every time the word is used? Definition as a part of the calculus acts only by being applied. 80(1)
    In what cases shall we say that the man understands the word ``blue''? In what circumstances will he be able to say it? or to say that he understood it in the past?
    If he says ``I picked the ball out by guesswork, I didn't understand the word'', ought we to believe him? ``He can't be wrong if he says that he didn't understand the word'': a remark on the grammar of the statement ``I didn't understand the word''. 81(1)
    We call understanding a mental state, and characterize it as a hypothetical process. Comparison between the grammar of mental processes and the grammar of brain processes.
    In certain circumstances both our picking out a red object from others on demand and our being able to give the ostensive definition of the word ``red'' are regarded as signs of understanding.
    We aren't interested here in the difference between thinking out loud (or in writing) and thinking in the imagination.
    What we call ``understanding'' is not the behaviour that shows us the understanding, but a state of which this behaviour is a sign. 82(2)
    We might call the recital of the rules on its own a criterion of understanding, or alternatively tests of use on their own. Or we may regard the recital of the rules as a symptom of the man's being able to do something other than recite the rules.
    To understand = to let a proposition work on one.
    When one remembers the meaning of a word, the remembering is not the mental process that one imagines at first sight.
    The psychological process of understanding is in the same case as the arithmetical object Three. 84(1)
    An explanation, a chart, is first used by being looked up, then by being looked up in the head, and finally as if it had never existed.
    A rule as the cause or history behind our present behaviour is of no interest to us. But a rule can be a hypothesis, or can itself enter into the conduct of the game. If a disposition is hypothesized in the player to give the list of rules on request, it is a disposition analogous to a physiological one. In our study of symbolism there is no foreground and background. 85(2)
    What interests us in the sign is what is embodied in the grammar of the sign. 87(1)
    IV
    The ostensive definition of signs is not an application of language, but part of the grammar: something like a rule for translation from a gesture language into a word-language. -- What belongs to grammar are all the conditions necessary for comparing the proposition with reality -- all the conditions necessary for its sense. 88(1)
    Does our language consist of primary signs (gestures) and secondary signs (words)?
    Obviously we would not be able to replace an ordinary sentence by gestures.
    ``Is it an accident that in order to define the signs I have to go outside the written and spoken signs?'' In that case isn't it strange that I can do anything at all with the written signs? 88(1)
    We say that a red label is the primary sign for the colour red, and the word a secondary sign. -- But must a Frenchman have a red image present to his mind when he understands my explanation ``red = rouge''? 89(1)
    Are the primary signs incapable of being misinterpreted? Can one say they don't any longer need to be understood? 90(1)
    A colour chart might be arranged differently or used differently, and yet the words mean the same colours as with us.
    Can a green label be a sample of red?
    Can it be said that when someone is painting a certain shade of green he is copying the red of a label?
    A sample is not used like a name. 90(1)
    ``Copy'' can mean various things. Various methods of comparison.
    We do not understand what is meant by ``this shade of colour is a copy of this note on the violin.'' It makes no sense to speak of a projection-method for association. 91(1)
    We can say that we communicate by signs whether we use words or samples, but the game of acting in accordance with words is different from the game of acting in accordance with samples. 92(1)
    ``There must be some sort of law for reading the chart. -- Otherwise how would one know how the table was to be used?'' It is part of human nature to understand pointing with the finger in the way we do.
    The chart does not compel me to use it always in the same way. 93(1)
    Is the word ``red'' enough to enable one to look for something red? Does one need a memory image to do so?
    An order. Is the real order ``Do now what you remember doing then?''
    If the colour sample appears darker than I remember it being yesterday, I need not agree with my memory. 94(1)
    ``Paint from memory the colour of the door of your room'' is no more unambiguous than ``paint the green you see on this chart.''
    I see the colour of the flower and recognize it.
    Even if I say ``no, this colour is brighter than the one I saw there,'' there is no process of comparing two simultaneously given shades of colour.
    Think of reading aloud from a written test (or writing to dictation). 95(1)
    ``Why do you choose this colour when given this order?'' -- ``Because this colour is opposite to the word `red' in my chart.'' In that case there is no sense in this question: ``Why do you call `red' the colour in the chart opposite the word `red'?''
    The connection between ``language and reality'' is made by definitions of words -- which belong to grammar. 96(1)
    A gesture language used to communicate with people who have no word-language in common with us. Do we feel there too the need to go outside language to explain its signs?
    The correlation between objects and names is a part of the symbolism. It gives the wrong idea if you say that the connection is a psychological one. 97(1)
    Someone copies a figure on the scale of 1 to 10. Is the understanding of the general rule of such mapping contained in the process of copying?
    Or was the process merely in agreement with that rule, but also in agreement with other rules? 97(1)
    Even if my pencil doesn't always do justice to the model, my intention always does. 98(1)
    For our studies it can never be essential that a symbolic phenomenon occurs in the mind and not on paper.
    An explanation of a sign can replace the sign itself -- this contrasts with causal explanation. 99(1)
    Reading. -- Deriving a translation from the original may also be a visible process.
    Always what represents is the system in which a sign is used.
    If `mental' processes can be true and false, their descriptions must be able to as well. 99(2)
    Every case of deriving an action from a command is the same kind of thing as the written derivation of a result.
    ``I write the number `16' here because it says `x2' there.''
    It might appear that some causality was operating here, but that would be a confusion between `reason' and `cause'. 101(1)
    V
    ``That's him'' -- that contains the whole problem of representation.
    I make a plan: I see myself acting thus and so. ``How do I know that it's myself?'' Or ``How do I know that the word `I' stands for me?''
    The delusion that in thought the objects do what the proposition states about them.
    ``I meant the victor of Austerlitz'' -- the past tense, which looks as if it was giving a description, is deceptive. 102(1)
    ``How does one think a proposition? How does thought use its expression?''
    Let's compare belief with the utterance of a sentence: the processes in the larynx etc. accompany the spoken sentence which alone interests us -- not as part of a mechanism, but as part of a calculus.
    We think we can't describe thought after the event because the delicate processes have been lost sight of.
    What is the function of thought? Its effect does not interest us. 103(2)
    But if thinking consists only in writing or speaking, why shouldn't a machine do it?
    Could a machine be in pain?
    It is a travesty of the truth to say: thinking is an activity of our mind, as writing is an activity of the hand. 105(1)
    `Thinking' `Language' are fluid concepts.
    The expression ``mental process'' is meant to distinguish `experience' from `physical processes'; or else we talk of `unconscious thoughts' -- of processes in a mind-model; or else the word ``thought'' is taken as synonymous with ``sense of a sentence''. 106(1)
    The idea that one language in contrast to others can have an order of words which corresponds to the order of thinking.
    Is it, as it were, a contamination of the sense that we express it in a particular language? Does it impair the rigour and purity of the proposition 25 x 25 = 625 that it is written down in a particular number system?
    Thought can only be something common-or-garden. But we are affected by this concept as we are by that of the number one. 107(2)
    What does man think for? There is no such thing as a ``thought-experiment''. I believe that more boilers would explode if people did not calculate when making boilers. Does it follow that there will in fact be fewer? The belief that fire will burn me is of the same nature as the fear that it will burn me. 109(1)
    My assumption that this house won't collapse may be the utterance of a sentence which is part of a calculation. I do have reasons for it. What counts as a reason for an assumption determines a calculus. -- So is the calculus something we adopt arbitrarily? No more so than the fear of fire.
    As long as we remain in the province of true-false games a change of grammar can only lead us from one game to another, and never from something true to something false. 110(2)
    VI
    What is a proposition? -- Do we have a single general concept of proposition? 112(1)
    ``What happens when a new proposition is taken into the language: what is the criterion for its being a proposition?''
    In this respect the concept of number is like the concept of proposition. On the other hand the concept of cardinal number can be called a rigorously circumscribed concept, that's to say it's a concept in a different sense of the word. 113(1)
    I possess the concept `language' from the languages I have learnt. ``But language can expand'': if ``expand'' makes sense here, I must now be able to specify how I imagine such an expansion.
    No sign leads us beyond itself.
    Does every newly constructed language broaden the concept of language? -- Comparison with the concept of number. 114(1)
    The indeterminacy of generality is not a logical indeterminacy.
    The task of philosophy is not to create an ideal language, but to clarify the use of existing language.
    I'm allowed to use the word ``rule'' without first tabulating the rules for the word. -- If philosophy was concerned with the concept of the calculus of all calculi, there would be such a thing as metaphilosophy. But there is not. 115(1)
    It isn't on the strength of a particular property, the property of being a rule, that we speak of the rules of a game. -- We use the word ``rule'' in contrast to ``word'', ``projection'' and some other words. 116(1)
    We learnt the meaning of the word ``plant'' by examples. And if we disregard hypothetical dispositions, these examples stand only for themselves. --
    The grammatical pace of the word ``game'' ``rule'' etc is given by examples in rather the way in which the place of a meeting is specified by saying that it will take place beside such and such a tree. 117(1)
    Meaning as something which comes before our minds when we hear a word.
    ``Show the children a game''.
    The sentence ``The Assyrians knew various games'' would strike us as curious since we wouldn't be certain that we could give an example. 118(1)
    Examples of the use of the word ``wish''. Our aim is not to give a theory of wishing, which would have to explain every case of wishing.
    The use of the words ``proposition'', ``language'', etc. has the haziness of the normal use of concept-words in our language. 119(2)
    The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in the sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life.
    (We are not justified in having any more scruples about our language than the chess player has about chess, namely none.) 121(1)
    Sounding like a sentence. We don't call everything `that sounds like a sentence' a sentence. -- If we disregard sounding like a sentence do we still have a general concept of proposition?
    The example of a language in which the order of the words in a sentence is the reverse of the present one. 122(1)
    The definition ``A proposition is whatever can be true or false''. -- The words ``true'' and ``false'' are items in a particular notation for the truth-functions.
    Does `` `p' is true'' state anything about the sign `p'? 123(1)
    In the schema ``This is how things stand'' the ``how things stand'' is a handle for the truth-functions.
    A general propositional form determines a proposition as part of a calculus. 124(1)
    The rules that say that such and such a combination of words yields no sense.
    ``How do I know that red can't be cut into bits?'' is not a question. I must begin with the distinction between sense and nonsense. I can't give it a foundation. 125(2)
    ``How must we make the grammatical rules for words if they are to give a sentence sense?'' --
    A proposition shows the possibility of the state of affairs it describes. ``Possible'' here means the same as ``conceivable''; representable in a particular system of propositions.
    The proposition ``I can imagine such and such a colour transition connects the linguistic representation with another form of representation; it is a proposition of grammar. 127(1)
    It looks as if we could say: Word-language allows of senseless combinations of words, but the language of imagining does not allow us to imagine anything senseless.
    ``Can you imagine it's being otherwise?'' -- How strange that one should be able to say that such and such a state of affairs is inconceivable! 128(2)
    The role of a proposition in the calculus is its sense.
    It is only in language that something is a proposition. To understand a proposition is to understand a language. 130(2)
    VII
    Symbols appear to be of their nature unsatisfied.
    A proposition seems to demand that reality be compared with it.
    ``A proposition like a ruler laid against reality.'' 132(1)
    If you see the expression of an expectation you see what is being expected.
    It looks as if the ultimate thing sought by an order had to remain unexpressed. -- As if the sign was trying to communicate with us.
    A sign does its job only in a grammatical system. 132(1)
    It seems as if the expectation and the fact satisfying the expectation fitted together somehow. Solids and hollows. -- Expectation is not related to its satisfaction in the same way as hunger is related to its satisfaction. 133(1)
    The strange thing that the event I expected isn't distinct from the one I expected. -- ``The report was not so loud as I had expected.''
    ``How can you say that the red which you see in front of you is the same as the red you imagined?'' -- One takes the meaning of the word ``red'' as being the sense of a proposition saying that something is red. 134(1)
    A red patch looks different from one that is not red. But it would be odd to say ``a red patch looks different when it is there from when it isn't there''. Or: ``How do you know that you are expecting a red patch?'' 135(1)
    How can I expect the event, when it isn't yet there at all? -- I can imagine a stag that is not there, in this meadow, but not kill one that is not there. -- It is not the expected thing that is the fulfilment, but rather its coming about. It is difficult for us to shake off this comparison: a man makes his appearance -- an event makes its appearance. 136(2)
    A search for a particular thing (e.g. my stick) is a particular kind of search, and differs from a search for something else because of what one does (says, thinks) while searching, not because of what one finds. -- Contrast looking for the trisection of the angle. 138(1)
    The symptoms of expectation are not the expression of expectation.
    In the sentence ``I expect that he is coming'' is one using the words ``he is coming'' in a different sense from the one they have in the assertion ``he is coming''?
    What makes it the expectation precisely of him?
    Various definitions of ``expecting a person X''.
    It isn't a later experience that decides what we are expecting. ``Let us put the expression of expectation in place of the expectation.'' 138(2)
    Expectation as preparatory behaviour.
    ``Expectation is a thought''
    If hunger is called a wish it is a hypothesis that just that will satisfy the wish.
    In ``I have been expecting him all day'' ``expect'' does not mean a persistent condition. 140(1)
    When I expect someone, -- what happens?
    What does the process of wanting to eat an apple consist in? 141(1)
    Intention and intentionality. --
    ``The thought that p is the case doesn't presuppose that it is the case; yet I can't think that something is red if the colour red does not exist.'' Here we mean the existence of a red sample as part of our language. 142(1)
    It's beginning to look somehow as if intention could never be recognized as intention from the outside. But the point is that one has to read off from a thought that it is the thought that such and such is the case. 143(1)
    This is connected with the question whether a machine could think. This is like when we say: ``The will can't be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, not something we do.'' But there's no doubt that you also have experiences when you move your arm voluntarily, although the phenomena of doing are indeed different from the phenomena of observing. But there are very different cases here. 144(1)
    The intention seems to interpret, to give the final interpretation.
    Imagine an `abstract' sign-language translated into an unambiguous picture-language. Here there seem to be no further possibilities of interpretation. -- We might say we didn't enter into the sign-language but did enter into the painted picture. Examples: picture, cinema, dream. 145(2)
    What happens is not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but: I do no interpreting.
    I imagine N. No interpretation accompanies this image; what gives the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies. 147(1)
    We want to say: ``Meaning is essentially a mental process, not a process in dead matter.'' -- What we are dissatisfied with here is the grammar of process, not the specific kind of process. 148(1)
    Doesn't the system of language provide me with a medium in which the proposition is no longer dead? -- ``Even if the expression of the wish is the wish, still the whole language isn't present during this expression.'' But that is not necessary. 149(1)
    In the gesture we don't see the real shadow of the fulfilment, the unambiguous shadow that admits of no further interpretation. 149(1)
    It's only considering the linguistic manifestation of a wish that makes it appear that my wish prefigures the fulfilment. -- Because it's the wish that just that were the case. -- It is in language that wish and fulfilment meet. 150(2)
    ``A proposition isn't a mere series of sounds, it is something more.'' Don't I see a sentence as part of a system of consequences? 152(2)
    ``This queer thing, thought.'' -- It strikes us as queer when we say that it connects objects in the mind. -- We're all ready to pass from it to the reality. -- ``How was it possible for thought to deal with the very person himself?'' Here I am being astonished by my own linguistic expression and momentarily misunderstanding it. 154(1)
    ``When I think of what will happen tomorrow I am mentally already in the future.'' -- Similarly people think that the endless series of cardinal numbers is somehow before our mind's eye, whenever we can use that expression significantly.
    A thought experiment is like a drawing of an experiment that is not carried out. 155(1)
    We said ``one cannot recognize intention as intention from the outside'' -- i.e. that it is not something that happens, or happens to us, but something we do. It is almost as if we said: we cannot see ourselves going to a place, because it is we who are doing the going. One does have a particular experience if one is doing the going oneself. 156(1)
    Fulfilment of expectation doesn't consist in some third thing's happening, such as a feeling of satisfaction. 157(2)
    VIII
    A description of language must achieve the same result as language itself.
    Suppose someone says that one can infer from a propsotion the fact that verifies it. What can one infer from a proposition apart from itself?
    The shadowy anticipation of a fact consists in our being able already to think that very thing will happen which hasn't yet happened. 159(1)
    However many steps I insert between the thought and its application, each intermediate step always follows the previous one without any intermediate link, and so too the application follows the last intermediate step. -- We can't cross the bridge to the execution (of an order) until we are there. 160(1)
    It is the calculus of thought that connects with extra-mental reality. From expectation to fulfilment is a step in a calculation. 160(1)
    We are -- as it were -- surprised, not at anyone's knowing the future, but at his being able to prophesy at all (right or wrong). 161(2)
    IX
    Is the pictorial character of thought an agreement with reality? In what sense can I say that a proposition is a picture? 163(1)
    The sense of a proposition and the sense of a picture. The different grammar of the expressions:
    ``This picture shows people at a village inn.''
    ``This picture shows the coronation of Napoleon.'' 164(1)
    A picture's telling me something will consist in my recognizing in it objects in some sort of characteristic arrangement. --
    What does ``this object is familiar to me'' mean? 165(1)
    ``I see what I see.'' I say that because I don't want to give a name to what I see. -- I want to exclude from my consideration of familiarity everything that is `historical'. -- The multiplicity of familiarity is that of feeling at home in what I see. 165(1)
    Understanding a genre picture: don't we recognize the painted people as people and the painted trees as trees, etc.?
    A picture of a human face is a no less familiar object than the human face itself. But there is no question of recognition here. 166(1)
    The false concept that recognizing always consists in comparing two impressions with one another. --
    ``We couldn't use words at all if we didn't recognize them and the objects they denote.'' Have we any sort of check on this recognition? 167(1)
    This shape I see is not simply a shape, but is one of the shapes I know. -- But it is not as if I were comparing the object with a picture set beside it, but as if the object coincided with the picture. I see only one thing, not two. 168(1)
    ``This face has a quite particular expression.'' We perhaps look for words and feel that everyday language is here too crude. 169(1)
    That a picture tells me something consists in its own form and colours. Or it narrates something to me: it uses words so to speak, and I am comparing the picture with a combination of linguistic forms. -- That a series of signs tells me something isn't constituted by its now making this impression on me. ``It's only in a language that something is a proposition.'' 169(1)
    `Language' is languages. -- Languages are systems.
    It is units of languages that I call ``propositions''. 170(1)
    Certainly, I read a story and don't give a hang about any system of language, any more than if it was a story in pictures. Suppose we were to say at this point ``something is a picture only in a picture-language.''? 171(1)
    We might imagine a language in whose use the impression made on us by the signs played no part.
    What I call a ``proposition'' is a position in the game of language.
    Thinking is an activity, like calculating. 171(1)
    A puzzle picture. What does it amount to to say that after the solution the picture means something to us, whereas it meant nothing before? 172(2)
    The impression is one thing, and the impression's being determinate is another thing. The impression of familiarity is perhaps the characteristics of the determinacy that every strong impression has. 174(1)
    Can I think away the impression of individual familiarity where it exists; and think it into a situation where it does not? The difficulty is not a psychological one. We have not determined what that is to mean.
    Can I look at a printed English word and see it as if I hadn't learnt to read?
    I can ascribe meaning to a meaningless shape. 175(1)
    We can read courage into a face and say ``now once more courage fits this face''. This is related to ``an attributive adjective agrees with the subject''.
    What do I do if I take a smile now as a kind one, now as malicious? This is connected with the contrast between saying and meaning. 176(2)
    A friendly mouth, friendly eyes, the wagging of a dog's tail are primary symbols of friendliness: they are parts of the phenomena that are called friendliness. If we want to imagine further appearances as expressions of friendliness, we read these symbols into them. It is not that I can imagine that this man's face might change so that it looked courageous, but that there is a quite definite way in which it can change into a courageous face.
    Think of the multifariousness of what we call ``language'': word-language, picture-language, gesture-language, sound-language. 178(1)
    ``This object is familiar to me' is like saying `this object is portrayed in my catalogue'.'' We are making the assumption that the picture in our catalogue is itself familiar.
    The sheath in my mind as a ``form of imagining''. -- The pattern is no longer presented as an object, which means that it didn't make sense to talk of a pattern at all.
    ``Familiarity: an object's fitting into a sheath'' -- that's not quite the same as our comparing what is seen with a copy.
    The question is ``What do I recognize as what?'' For ``to recognize a thing as itself'' is meaningless. 179(2)
    The comparison between memory and a notebook.
    How did I read off from the memory image that I stood thus at the window yesterday? What made you so certain when you spoke those words? Nothing; I was certain.
    How do I react to a memory? 181(1)
    Operating with written signs and operating with ``imagination pictures''.
    An attitude to a picture (to a thought) is what connects it with reality. 182(2)
    X
    Grammatical rules determine a meaning and are not answerable to any meaning that they could contradict.
    Why don't I call cookery rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary?
    I don't call an argument good just because it has the consequences I want.
    The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement. 184(1)
    Doesn't grammar put the primary colours together because there is a kind of similarity between them? Or colours, anyway, in contrast to shapes or notes?
    The rules of grammar cannot be justified by shewing that their application makes a representation agree with reality.
    The analogy between grammar and games. 185(2)
    Langauge considered as a part of a psychological mechanism.
    I do not use ``this is the sign for sugar'' in the same way as the sentence ``if I press this button, I get a piece of sugar''. 187(1)
    Suppose we compare grammar to a keyboard which I can use to direct a man by pressing different combinations of keys. What corresponds in this case to the grammar of language?
    If the utterance of a `nonsensical' combination of words has the effect that the other person stares at me, I don't on that account call it the order to stare. 188(1)
    Language is not defined for us as an arrangement fulfilling a definite purpose. 189(1)
    Grammar consists of conventions -- say in a chart. This might be a part of a mechanism. But it is the connection and not the effect which determines the meaning.
    Can one speak of a grammar in the case where a language is taught to a person by a mere drill? 190(1)
    I do not scruple to invent causal connections in the mechanism of language.
    To invent a keyboard might mean to invent something that had the desired effect; or else to devise new forms which were similar to the old ones in various ways.
    ``It is always for living beings that signs exist.'' 191(1)
    Inventing a language -- inventing an instrument -- inventing a game.
    If we imagine a goal for chess -- say entertainment -- then the rules are not arbitrary. So too for the choice of a unit of measurement.
    We can't say ``without language we couldn't communicate with one another''. The concept of language is contained in the concept of communication. 192(1)
    Philosophy is philosophical problems. Their common element extends as far as the common element in different regions of our language.
    Something that at first sight looks like a proposition and is not one. Something that looks like a design for a steamroller and is not one. 193(1)
    Are we willing to call a series of independent signals ``a language''?
    Imagine a diary kept with signals. Are explanations given so that the signals are connected to another language?
    A language consisting of commands. We wouldn't say that a series of such signals alone would enable me to derive a picture of the movement of a man obeying them unless in addition to the signal there is something that might be called a general rule for translating into drawing.
    The grammar explains the meaning of the signs and thus makes the language pictorial. 194(5)
    Appendix
    Complex and Fact. 199(3)
    Concept and Object, Property and Substrate. 202(6)
    Objects. 208(2)
    Elementary propositions. 210(5)
    Is time essential to propositions? Comparison between time and truth-functions. 215(4)
    The nature of hypotheses. 219(5)
    Probability. 224(12)
    The concept ``about''. The problem of the heap. 236(7)
    Part II On Logic and Mathematics
    Logical Inference
    Is it because we understand the propositions that we know that q entails p? Does a sense give rise to the entailment? 243(4)
    ``If p follows from q, then thinking that q must involve thinking that p.'' 247(3)
    The case of infinitely many propositions following from a single one. 250(5)
    Can an experience show that one proposition follows from another? 255(2)
    Generality
    The proposition ``The circle is in the square'' is in a certain sense independent of the assignment of a particular position. (In a certain sense it is totally unconnected.) 257(4)
    The proposition ``The circle is in the square'' is not a disjunction of cases. 261(4)
    The inadequacy of the Frege-Russell notation for generality. 265(3)
    Criticism of my former view of generality. 268(2)
    The explanation of generality by examples. 270(10)
    The law of a series. ``And so on''. 280(9)
    The Foundations of Mathematics
    The comparison between Mathematics and a game. 289(7)
    There is no metamathematics. 296(3)
    Proofs of relevance. 299(4)
    Consistency proofs 303(3)
    Justifying arithmetic and preparing it for its application (Russell, Ramsey). 306(9)
    Ramsey's theory of identity. 315(4)
    The concept of the application of arithmetic (mathematics) 319(2)
    On Cardinal Numbers
    Kinds of cardinal number 321(11)
    2 + 2 = 4. 332(16)
    Statements of number within mathematics. 348(3)
    Sameness of number and sameness of length. 351(8)
    Mathematical Proof
    In other cases, if I am looking for something, then even before it is found I can describe what finding is; not so, if I am looking for the solution of a mathematical problem.
    Mathematical expeditions and Polar expeditions. 359(7)
    Proof and the truth and falsehood of mathematical propositions. 366(3)
    If you want to know what is proved, look at the proof. 369(8)
    Mathematical problems. Kinds of problems. Search. ``Projects'' in mathematics. 377(6)
    Euler's Proof. 383(4)
    The trisection of an angle etc. 387(6)
    Searching and trying. 393(2)
    Inductive Proofs and Periodicity
    How far is a proof by induction a proof of a proposition? 395(2)
    Recursive proof and the concept of proposition. Is the proof a proof that a proposition is true and its contradictory false? 397(3)
    Induction, (x). φx and (Ex). φx. Does the induction prove the general proposition true and an existential proposition false? 400(5)
    Is there a further step from writing the recursive proof to the generalization? Doesn't the recursion schema already say all that is to be said? 405(3)
    How far does a recursive proof deserve the name of ``proof''. How far is a step in accordance with the paradigm A justified by the proof of B? 408(17)
    The recursive proof does not reduce the number of fundamental laws. 425(2)
    Recurring decimals 1:3 = 0.3. 427(3)
    The recursive proof as a series of proofs. 430(7)
    Seeing or viewing a sign in a particular manner. Discovering an aspect of a mathematical expression. ``Seeing an expression in a particular way.'' Marks of emphasis. 437(11)
    Proof by induction, arithmetic and algebra. 448(3)
    Infinity in Mathematics
    Generality in arithmetic. 451(9)
    On set theory. 460(11)
    The extensional conception of the real numbers. 471(4)
    Kinds of irrational number (π'P,F). 475(8)
    Irregular infinite decimals. 483(4)
    Note in Editing. 487(4)
    Translator's note. 491

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상품정보
ISBN 9780520245020 ( 0520245024 )
발행(출시)일자 2005년 06월 01일
쪽수 496쪽
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147 * 203 * 26 mm / 562 g
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언어 영어

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    • 상품 주문 시, 해당 상품의 적립률에 따라 적립 예정 포인트가 자동 합산되고 주문하신 상품이 발송완료 된 후에 자동으로 적립됩니다.
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  • 통합포인트 적립 안내

    • 통합포인트는 도서정가제 범위 내에서 적용됩니다.
    • 추가적립 및 회원 혜택은 도서정가제 대상상품(국내도서, eBook등)으로만 주문시는 해당되지 않습니다.
  • 기본적립) 상품별 적립금액

    • 온라인교보문고에서 상품 구매시 상품의 적립률에 따라 적립됩니다.
    • 단 도서정가제 적용 대상인 국내도서,eBook은 15%내에서 할인율을 제외한 금액내로 적립됩니다.
  • 추가적립) 5만원 이상 구매시 통합포인트 2천원 추가적립

    • 5만원 이상 구매시 통합포인트 2천원 적립됩니다.
    • 도서정가제 예외상품(외서,음반,DVD,잡지(일부),기프트) 2천원 이상 포함시 적립 가능합니다.
    • 주문하신 상품이 전체 품절인 경우 적립되지 않습니다.
  • 회원혜택) 3만원이상 구매시 회원등급별 2~4% 추가적립

    • 회원등급이 플래티넘, 골드, 실버 등급의 경우 추가적립 됩니다.
    • 추가적립은 실결제액 기준(쿠폰 및 마일리지, 통합포인트, e교환권 사용액 제외) 3만원 이상일 경우 적립됩니다.
    • 주문 후 취소,반품분의 통합포인트는 단품별로 회수되며, 반품으로 인해 결제잔액이 3만원 미만으로 변경될 경우 추가 통합포인트는 전액 회수될 수 있습니다.

제휴 포인트 안내

제휴 포인트 사용

  • OK CASHBAG 10원 단위사용 (사용금액 제한없음)
  • GS&POINT 최대 10만 원 사용
더보기

구매방법 별 배송안내

지역별 도착 예정일

수도권 지역

배송 일정 안내 테이블로 결제 완료 시간, 도착예정일 결제 완료 시간 컬럼의 하위로 평일 0시 ~ 12시 토요일 0시 ~ 11시 평일 12시 ~ 22시 평일 12시 ~ 24시 토요일 11시 ~ 21시 을(를) 나타낸 표입니다.
결제 완료 시간 도착예정일
평일 0시 ~ 12시

토요일 0시 ~ 11시
당일배송 오늘

당일배송 오늘
평일 12시 ~ 22시

평일 12시 ~ 24시

토요일 11시 ~ 21시
새벽배송 내일 07시 이전

내일

일요배송 일요일

수도권 외 (천안, 대전, 울산, 부산, 대구, 창원)

배송 일정 안내 테이블로 결제 완료 시간, 도착예정일 결제 완료 시간 컬럼의 하위로 월~토 0시 ~ 11시 30분 을(를) 나타낸 표입니다.
결제 완료 시간 도착예정일
월~토 0시 ~ 11시 30분
당일배송 오늘

배송 유의사항

  • 새벽배송과 일요배송은 수도권 일부 지역을 대상으로 합니다. 상품 상세페이지에서 도착 예정일을 확인해 주세요.
  • 수도권 외 지역에서 선물포장하기 또는 사은품을 포함하여 주문할 경우 당일배송 불가합니다.
  • 무통장입금 주문 후 당일 배송 가능 시간 이후 입금된 경우 당일 배송 불가합니다.
  • 새벽배송의 경우 공동 현관 출입 번호가 누락 되었거나 틀릴 경우 요청하신 방법으로 출입이 어려워, 부득이하게 공동 현관 또는 경비실 앞에 배송 될 수 있습니다.
  • 학교, 관공서, 회사 등 출입 제한 시간이 있는 곳은 당일배송, 새벽배송, 일요배송이 제공되지 않을 수 있습니다.
  • 공휴일과 겹친 토요일, 일요일은 일요일 배송에서 제외됩니다. 일요배송은 한정 수량에 한해 제공됩니다. 수량 초과 시 일반배송으로 발송되니 주문 시 도착 예정일을 확인해 주세요.
  • 주문 후 배송지 변경 시 변경된 배송지에 따라 익일 배송될 수 있습니다.
  • 수도권 외 지역의 경우 효율적인 배송을 위해 각 지역 매장에서 택배를 발송하므로, 주문 시의 부록과 상이할 수 있습니다.
  • 각 지역 매장에서 재고 부족 시 재고 확보를 위해 당일 배송이 불가할 수 있습니다.
  • 기상악화로 인한 도로 사정으로 일부 지역의 배송 지연이 발생될 수 있습니다.
  • 출고 예정일이 5일 이상인 상품의 경우(결제일로부터 7일 동안 미입고), 출판사 / 유통사 사정으로 품/절판 되어 구입이 어려울 수 있습니다. 이 경우 SMS, 메일로 알려드립니다.
  • 분철상품 주문 시 분철 작업으로 인해 기존 도착 예정일에 2일 정도 추가되며, 당일 배송, 해외 배송이 불가합니다.
  • 해외주문도서는 해외 거래처 사정에 의해 품절/지연될 수 있습니다.
  • 스페셜오더 도서나 일서 해외 주문 도서와 함께 주문 시 배송일이 이에 맞추어 지연되오니, 이점 유의해 주시기 바랍니다.

바로드림존에서 받기

  1. STEP 01
    매장 선택 후 바로드림 주문
  2. STEP 02
    준비완료 알림 시 매장 방문하기
  3. STEP 03
    바로드림존에서 주문상품 받기
  • 바로드림은 전국 교보문고 매장 및 교내서점에서 이용 가능합니다.
  • 잡지 및 일부 도서는 바로드림 이용이 불가합니다.
  • 각 매장 운영시간에 따라 바로드림 이용 시간이 달라질 수 있습니다.

수령 안내

  • 안내되는 재고수량은 서비스 운영 목적에 따라 상이할 수 있으므로 해당 매장에 문의해주시기 바랍니다.
  • 바로드림 주문 후 재고가 실시간 변동되어, 수령 예상 시간에 수령이 어려울 수 있습니다.

취소/교환/반품 안내

  • 주문 후 7일간 찾아가지 않으시면, 자동으로 결제가 취소됩니다.
  • 취소된 금액은 결제수단의 승인취소 및 예치금으로 전환됩니다.
  • 교환/반품은 수령하신 매장에서만 가능합니다.

사은품 관련 안내

  • 바로드림 서비스는 일부 1+1 도서, 경품, 사은품 등이 포함 되지 않습니다.

음반/DVD 바로드림시 유의사항

  • 음반/DVD 상품은 바로드림 주문 후 수령점 변경이 불가합니다. 주문 전 수령점을 꼭 확인해 주세요.
  • 사은품(포스터,엽서 등)은 증정되지 않습니다.
  • 커버이미지 랜덤발매 음반은 버전 선택이 불가합니다.
  • 광화문점,강남점,대구점,영등포점,잠실점은 [직접 찾아 바로드림존 가기], [바로드림존에서 받기] 로 주문시 음반 코너에서 수령확인이 가능합니다
  • 선물 받는 분의 휴대폰번호만 입력하신 후 결제하시면 받는 분 휴대폰으로 선물번호가 전달됩니다.
  • 문자를 받은 분께서는 마이 > 주문관리 > 모바일 선물내역 화면에서 선물번호와 배송지 정보를 입력하시면 선물주문이 완료되어 상품준비 및 배송이 진행됩니다.
  • 선물하기 결제하신 후 14일까지 받는 분이 선물번호를 등록하지 않으실 경우 주문은 자동취소 됩니다.
  • 또한 배송 전 상품이 품절 / 절판 될 경우 주문은 자동취소 됩니다.

바로드림 서비스 안내

  1. STEP 01
    매장 선택 후 바로드림 주문
  2. STEP 02
    준비완료 알림 시 매장 방문하기
  3. STEP 03
    바로드림존에서 주문상품 받기
  • 바로드림은 전국 교보문고 매장 및 교내서점에서 이용 가능합니다.
  • 잡지 및 일부 도서는 바로드림 이용이 불가합니다.
  • 각 매장 운영시간에 따라 바로드림 이용 시간이 달라질 수 있습니다.

수령 안내

  • 안내되는 재고수량은 서비스 운영 목적에 따라 상이할 수 있으므로 해당 매장에 문의해주시기 바랍니다.
  • 바로드림 주문 후 재고가 실시간 변동되어, 수령 예상시간에 수령이 어려울 수 있습니다.

취소/교환/반품 안내

  • 주문 후 7일간 찾아가지 않으시면, 자동으로 결제가 취소됩니다.
  • 취소된 금액은 결제수단의 승인취소 및 예치금으로 전환됩니다.
  • 교환/반품은 수령하신 매장에서만 가능합니다.

사은품 관련 안내

  • 바로드림 서비스는 일부 1+1 도서, 경품, 사은품 등이 포함되지 않습니다.

음반/DVD 바로드림시 유의사항

  • 음반/DVD 상품은 바로드림 주문 후 수령점 변경이 불가합니다. 주문 전 수령점을 꼭 확인해주세요.
  • 사은품(포스터,엽서 등)은 증정되지 않습니다.
  • 커버이미지 랜덤발매 음반은 버전 선택이 불가합니다.
  • 광화문점,강남점,대구점,영등포점,잠실점은 [직접 찾아 바로드림존 가기], [바로드림존에서 받기] 로 주문시 음반코너에서 수령확인이 가능합니다.
  1. STEP 01
    픽업박스에서 찾기 주문
  2. STEP 02
    도서준비완료 후 휴대폰으로 인증번호 전송
  3. STEP 03
    매장 방문하여 픽업박스에서 인증번호 입력 후 도서 픽업
  • 바로드림은 전국 교보문고 매장 및 교내서점에서 이용 가능합니다.
  • 잡지 및 일부 도서는 바로드림 이용이 불가합니다.
  • 각 매장 운영시간에 따라 바로드림 이용 시간이 달라질 수 있습니다.

수령 안내

  • 안내되는 재고수량은 서비스 운영 목적에 따라 상이할 수 있으므로 해당 매장에 문의해주시기 바랍니다.
  • 바로드림 주문 후 재고가 실시간 변동되어, 수령 예상시간에 수령이 어려울 수 있습니다.

취소/교환/반품 안내

  • 주문 후 7일간 찾아가지 않으시면, 자동으로 결제가 취소됩니다.
  • 취소된 금액은 결제수단의 승인취소 및 예치금으로 전환됩니다.
  • 교환/반품은 수령하신 매장에서만 가능합니다.

사은품 관련 안내

  • 바로드림 서비스는 일부 1+1 도서, 경품, 사은품 등이 포함되지 않습니다.

음반/DVD 바로드림시 유의사항

  • 음반/DVD 상품은 바로드림 주문 후 수령점 변경이 불가합니다. 주문 전 수령점을 꼭 확인해주세요.
  • 사은품(포스터,엽서 등)은 증정되지 않습니다.
  • 커버이미지 랜덤발매 음반은 버전 선택이 불가합니다.
  • 광화문점,강남점,대구점,영등포점,잠실점은 [직접 찾아 바로드림존 가기], [바로드림존에서 받기] 로 주문시 음반코너에서 수령확인이 가능합니다.

도서 소득공제 안내

  • 도서 소득공제란?

    • 2018년 7월 1일 부터 근로소득자가 신용카드 등으로 도서구입 및 공연을 관람하기 위해 사용한 금액이 추가 공제됩니다. (추가 공제한도 100만원까지 인정)
      • 총 급여 7,000만 원 이하 근로소득자 중 신용카드, 직불카드 등 사용액이 총급여의 25%가 넘는 사람에게 적용
      • 현재 ‘신용카드 등 사용금액’의 소득 공제한도는 300만 원이고 신용카드사용액의 공제율은 15%이지만, 도서·공연 사용분은 추가로 100만 원의 소득 공제한도가 인정되고 공제율은 30%로 적용
      • 시행시기 이후 도서·공연 사용액에 대해서는 “2018년 귀속 근로소득 연말 정산”시기(19.1.15~)에 국세청 홈택스 연말정산간소화 서비스 제공
  • 도서 소득공제 대상

    • 도서(내서,외서,해외주문도서), eBook(구매)
    • 도서 소득공제 대상 상품에 수반되는 국내 배송비 (해외 배송비 제외)
      • 제외상품 : 잡지 등 정기 간행물, 음반, DVD, 기프트, eBook(대여,학술논문), 사은품, 선물포장, 책 그리고 꽃
      • 상품정보의 “소득공제” 표기를 참고하시기 바랍니다.
  • 도서 소득공제 가능 결제수단

    • 카드결제 : 신용카드(개인카드에 한함)
    • 현금결제 : 예치금, 교보e캐시(충전에한함), 해피머니상품권, 컬쳐캐쉬, 기프트 카드, 실시간계좌이체, 온라인입금
    • 간편결제 : 교보페이, 네이버페이, 삼성페이, 카카오페이, PAYCO, 토스, CHAI
      • 현금결제는 현금영수증을 개인소득공제용으로 신청 시에만 도서 소득공제 됩니다.
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알림 신청

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알림신청 취소는 마이룸 > 알림신청내역에서 가능합니다.

해외주문 · POD Philosophical Grammar
0002/ERevised | Paperback
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